1.79 The problem. Canada borders three oceans and has historical links to the fishery and has a strong interest in ensuring the conservation and sustainable operation of its fisheries. In recent years, Canada`s east coast has seen a decline in many fish stocks. Several factors contributed to this decline, including growth in the size and capacity of fishing fleets and environmental factors such as changes in water temperature. 54 During the participation phase of the game, each country makes a binary choice: either it joins the IEA or it stays away. In the mitigation phase, non-members adopt their predominant strategy of not running out of steam and members follow the IEA`s instructions. A non-cooperative Nash balance in this game is both “stable internal” (no member wants to leave the agreement) and “stable external” (no non-member member wants to join it), with participation decisions from other countries being considered data. There are two Nash balances: M -0 and M -h (?). We only look at the second one below. To verify that h (?) is a Nash balance, note that the payment of each signatory is not negative; No signatory wants a default because the resulting IEA would choose not to dered, so the defector will have zero payment. No non-signatory wants to join because the additional costs outweigh the added benefit: ? > 1. Global environmental issues that MEAs are expected to address include biodiversity loss, the adverse effects of climate change, ozone depletion, hazardous waste, organic pollutants, marine pollution, trade in endangered species, destruction of wetlands, etc.

A systematic and comprehensive catalogue of all IEAs requires a clear and explicit definition of each element of the expression. The definitions used in the IEA`s draft database (“agreements,” “international,” “environment” and “line”) are designed: 1.19 performance forecasts. The definition of clear, quantified and time-limited performance expectations is an essential cornerstone of effective accountability. Services cannot be held responsible for achieving results unless these results are adequately defined in the first place. However, setting expectations and subsequently measuring actual results on these expectations can be a huge challenge in addressing complex environmental issues. 1.119 Our five case studies provided additional information on the responsibility of responsible services for the outcome of their agreements. We found that, overall, there is no significant difference between the way the federal government manages and takes into account environmental policies and objectives set out in international environmental agreements and those defined elsewhere. There are no management guidelines, procedures or mechanisms that apply exclusively to international environmental agreements. Results similar to those of other government policies, programs or initiatives are in fact considered.

We believe that this is neither an unexpected point of view nor a problem, as long as the principles of accountability are applied. However, we found that the key elements of accountability are not always present. 1.58 The trial showed that Environment Canada was aware of NOx and VOC emission estimates and the resulting ground-level ozone concentration in the air. There is a clear objective for the desired environmental outcome – the reduction of soil concentration in the ozone zone – as well as the estimated emission reduction targets that are needed to contribute to this outcome. In addition, the Department measures the results of both ground ozone concentration and estimated NOx and VOC emissions. Given that there are clear and comparable measures against desired environmental outcomes, we believe this is a report against the results and purpose of the ozone annex.